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The purpose of this essay is to investigate the nature of the 
term “progressive” both in its historical context and as a political 
concept.  I do so by combining political history, the history of ideas, 
and political philosophy, with the goal of elucidating key themes 
that lie at the core of contemporary progressive politics. 
The essay has four main sections.  The first provides an 
account of progressivism as it has been understood in the recent 
history of the United States.1  The second offers a discussion of the 
development of the modern concept of “progress.”2  The third uses 
the work of John Rawls to explore the roles of neutrality and 
context in political policy and rationality—a theme that runs 
throughout much progressive literature.3  The fourth examines the 
relationship between morality and the free market with special 
attention to Adam Smith, the eighteenth-century progenitor of 
modern capitalism.4  I conclude with a brief and tentative 
definition of “progressive” that I hope will spark further discussion.5 
A great deal has been left out of this essay, not the least of 
which is the progressive educational movement, as typified by John 
Dewey and others.  I am selective in my approach in order to 
emphasize those issues that are the most relevant to contemporary 
discourse.  My discussion covers a great deal of ground and relies 
upon methodologies from a range of disciplines.  For this reason, I 
have, in most cases, presented centrist and moderate interpretation 
of the thinkers I cite.  I have also eschewed frequent reference to 
secondary literature so as to avoid getting mired in subtle issues of 
interpretation. 
I make no claims as to the definitive nature of my observations 
and conclusions.  This discussion should be seen as preliminary at 
best, and on the occasion of this special issue of the William Mitchell 
Law Review, my intent is to present an introductory exploration that 
helps explicate themes that are found throughout the essays that 
follow. 
I. PROGRESSIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
The term “progressive” is not straightforward.  The more one 
delves into its history in the United States, the more evident it 
 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra Part V. 
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becomes that there is no one set of principles or single ideology 
that unifies those who fall under its moniker.  Today, American 
progressives are on the political left; that much is clear.6  But how 
far left on the spectrum they fall is uncertain.  They are not 
revolutionaries.  They seek change, not social upheaval, although 
sometimes this change is significant and can be traumatic.  Nor are 
progressives so far to the extreme that they are in bed with the 
right.7 
Progressives are strongly attached to the government; they 
tend towards state intervention.  Yet, they also believe in citizen 
participation and grassroots action.  Perhaps more than any other 
political classification, progressives hold onto the ideal of direct 
democracy.  They heartily embrace the tensions between what 
Isaiah Berlin called negative and positive freedoms, or freedom 
from and freedom to, respectively.8 For Berlin, the freedom from 
hindrance, or “negative” liberty, trumps the freedom to self-
actualize, but progressives disagree.9  Today’s progressives might 
argue that, while liberty is important, it is incoherent without 
entitlements.  The state must provide social, political, economic, 
and cultural assistance to those who are denied access to an equal 
playing field.  Progressives claim that one cannot have liberty 
without cultivating capabilities. 
The role of progressivism is further complicated by the 
contemporary political climate. In a post-Willie Horton world, the 
word “liberal” is deemed by many to be political suicide.  The term 
“progressive” is the most likely candidate to fill its role.  As one 
Democratic activist in North Dakota reported to me, she uses the 
term precisely because it sounds more centrist to her audience than 
the term liberal.  The tragic death of Paul Wellstone, Minnesota’s 
most promising liberal, was portrayed as the death of a Minnesota 
progressive.10  His memorial service, a political event used by the 
right to further delegitimize its opponents, occurred a few years 
 
 6. This is in contrast to Canada, for example, where the Progressive 
Conservative Party is right of center. 
 7. This odd convergence is the purview of libertarians (and, on occasion, 
single-issue interest groups such as those who oppose pornography). 
 8. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 
191, 194–206 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1998).  Berlin regards a 
commitment to positive freedom as a dangerous form of Hegelian proto-fascism. 
 9. Id. at 212–16. 
 10. Jack Russell Weinstein, Democrats Must Stop Apologizing for Liberal Beliefs, 
THE GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Nov. 13, 2003, available at http://www.und. 
nodak.edu/instruct/weinstei/gfheraldnov13.htm. 
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before the passing of the elder icon of Minnesota progressivism, 
Eugene McCarthy. 
A. Twentieth Century Progressivism 
McCarthy’s Minnesota Progressive Party—the party formed to 
support his 1988 bid for president—was not the first to bear the 
name.  The first national Progressive Party ran Theodore Roosevelt 
for president in 1912.11  But Roosevelt’s party did not have a 
monopoly on progressive thought.  The descriptor was used by a 
disparate group of political movements responding to and 
inspiring large scale political and institutional changes during the 
early twentieth century: two decades that saw the women’s suffrage 
movement, the labor movement, an active conservation movement, 
increasing industrialization, a large scale increase in government 
regulations, education reform, and increased urbanization, to 
name some of the more major political concerns.  “Despite the 
Republican capitalist approach, there was also a strong and 
successful socialist movement during much of the early Progressive 
Era.”12  This tension between socialism and capitalism foreshadows 
contemporary progressive attachment to both governmental 
regulation and direct political participation. 
As corporate interests in America became more powerful, 
historians of the Progressive Era point to a widespread realization 
that these businesses were a corrupting force on American politics.  
 
 11. Roosevelt ran as a progressive after the Republican Party refused to 
nominate him.  This was Lincoln’s Republican Party, not George W. Bush’s G.O.P.  
They supported women’s suffrage, labor reform, farm relief, health insurance in 
industry, and taxes on inheritance.  Early twentieth-century Democrats were still 
associated with the depression of the 1890s and were minorities in all but some 
southern states, whereas the Republicans, although they  “spoke for and endorsed 
the work of the nation’s capitalists,” did so through “advocacy of governmental 
action to promote economic growth,” and inspired a “broad coalition of 
prosperous farmers, urban workers, and businessmen.”  Lewis L. Gould, 
Introduction to THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1, 5–6 (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974). 
 12. Socialists won mayoral races in: 
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and other industrial states; party members sat 
in state legislatures, and a handful went to the House of Representatives.  
The perennial presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, Eugene V. 
Debs, saw his vote increase from 94,000 in 1900 to nearly 900,000 in 
1912.  A variety of daily and weekly newspapers carried socialism’s 
message into all sections of the nation.  Ranging from the Industrial 
Workers of the World to the moral political aims of Debs, socialism was a 
genuine third force of the American political landscape. 
Id. at 7. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/1
1. WEINSTEIN - RC.DOC 11/21/2006  12:37:10 PM 
2006] ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM PROGRESSIVE 5 
By the close of Roosevelt’s presidency, “[one] percent of American 
companies . . . turned out nearly [forty-five] percent of the nation’s 
manufactured goods.  Smaller businessmen and idle-class 
professionals . . . spearheaded an emerging effort to tame business 
giants through strengthened regulatory legislation.”13  In turn, the 
very structure of American society shifted to follow the dominant 
business model: “The United States became an organized, 
bureaucratic society whose model institution was a large 
corporation.”14  Simultaneously, though, “interest-group 
organizations of all sorts successfully forged permanent, non-
electoral means of influencing the government and its agencies.”15  
The more bureaucratic social organizations became, the more the 
population sought to find methods of political participation 
outside the bureaucracy. 
There is a strong strand of populism here, but there is also a 
reworking of procedural democracy that was both a factor in, and a 
reaction to, a fundamental shift in American governing policy: 
Where nineteenth-century policy had generally focused 
on distinct groups and locales (most characteristically 
through the distribution of resources and privileges to 
enterprising individuals and corporations), the 
government now began to take explicit account of 
clashing interests and to assume the responsibility for 
mitigating their conflicts through regulation, 
administration, and planning.16 
American students are generally taught that politics is the 
negotiation of compromise among numerous conflicting special 
interest groups, but this was not always the case.  The focus on 
allocating resources to groups rather than to regions is an 
outgrowth of progressive political participation.  On the one hand, 
progressivism saw an increase in grassroots political participation, 
returning authority to the individual citizen.  On the other, it 
endorsed an increase in power centralization.  For progressives, the 
government takes the primary role in creating the rules of political 
and, perhaps, social engagement.  It also negotiates minimal 
standards of living and working.  It is therefore fair to argue that 
 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A 
Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247, 248 (1981). 
 15. Id. at 251. 
 16. Id. 
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progressivism initiated the next stage in “the modern American 
liberal state . . . with its bureaucratically centralized structure and 
concern for social welfare.”17  The disparate causes, methods, and 
philosophical and political aims of the period make it impossible to 
classify all these groups as sharing any substantive commonalities 
larger than the desire for change itself.  What unified the 
Progressive Era was the spirit of reform. 
B. Nineteenth Century Reforms 
Once again, however, we have to go farther back in history to 
understand the early twentieth century reformist outlook.  In 1879, 
Henry George’s influential Progress and Poverty argued that suffering 
and poverty were not necessary components of the modern world, 
particularly since the nation’s wealth continued to grow.18  Building 
on Christian principles, he argued that “social justice and 
Christianity were synonymous.”19  This marked a significant change 
in religious politics.  Churches at the time were “largely for the 
mutual insurance of the prosperous families, and not for the 
upbuilding of the great under-class of humanity.”20  In response, 
socially conscious Christians participated in the Social Gospel 
Movement, a political force moved forward by Charles Sheldon’s 
influential novel In His Steps.21 
This concern for poverty proved to be widespread.  The Social 
Gospel Movement, combined with secular settlement houses such 
as the Henry Street Settlement in New York City in 1886 and the 
famous Hull House in Chicago in 1888, resulted in “more than a 
hundred settlements in 1900 and four hundred by 1910.”22  
Religious activists’ interaction with the poor led them to advocate 
for “cleaner streets, more play grounds, and better schools . . . new 
child labor laws, factory inspection, regulation of working hours, 
taxation of inheritance, and strict regulation, or even confiscation 
of natural monopolies like public utilities.”23 
 
 17. William G. Anderson, Progressivism: An Historiographical Essay, 6 HIST. 
TCHR. 427, 427 (1973). 
 18. Stanley P. Caine, The Origins of Progressivism, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 11, 
11 (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974). 
 19. Id. at 13. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Perhaps for the first time in such a context, this novel asked the question 
“What Would Jesus Do?”  Id. 
 22. Id. at 14. 
 23. Id. 
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Religious movements were supplemented by an academic 
movement: scholars of the time challenged the dominant laissez 
faire doctrine that governed economic thinking and argued that the 
new social sciences provided evidence that “science and the ideal of 
human brotherhood were complementary.”24  At the time, 
economist Richard T. Ely argued that “the widening and 
deepening range of ethical obligations rests upon the basis of solid 
facts.”25  These university scholars grew in importance as the 
progressive movements grew in power.  They offered European 
solutions to social difficulties, including, especially, advocating the 
German notion that the state could be an instrument of social 
change.26 
In his essay The Origins of Progressivism, Stanley P. Caine 
outlines numerous other influences and tensions that lead to the 
Progressive Era—many of which stem from decades before the 
reformist spirit took hold.  Among them was the strength of 
populism and its counter-force, the mugwumps,27 who “mourned 
the absence of character, breeding, and the ideas that had 
characterized American society in an earlier era.”28  Additionally, 
the economic crises of the 1890s29 influenced many, including the 
muckraking journalists that were essential to the Progressive Era. 
Caine argues that the 1890s was “a decade in transition,” an 
“indecisive” period that led to the more assertive progressive years 
that followed.  The combination of socialism, capitalism, and 
populism intersected30 to form the “three categories” that Caine 
concludes lay at the heart of progressivism: “more direct 
democratic control over government, new forms of taxation to 
eliminate privilege and assure more equitable distribution of 
 
 24. Id. at 16.  See also infra Part IV for further discussion. 
 25. Caine, supra note 18, at 16. 
 26. For example, “[t]he settlement idea, the eight-hour day, public ownership 
of utilities, public housing, unemployment insurance, and old-age pensions were 
all tried first in Europe, then brought by progressives to America.”  Id. at 17–18. 
 27. “Mugwumps” were Republicans who supported Democrat Grover 
Cleveland in his 1884 presidential bid. 
 28. Caine, supra note 18, at 19. 
 29. Extensive newspaper and magazine coverage chronicled the economic 
suffering of the time, such as the twenty percent unemployment rate and the 
violent end to the Pullman walkout when twelve people died after President 
Cleveland ordered federal troops to break the strike. 
 30. Populism is not an economic theory in the same category as socialism and 
capitalism. However, as each of these theories carry within them presumed and 
preferred political structures, as well as implications for political participation, it 
seems reasonable to understand populism as a counter-force to the other two. 
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society’s benefits, and the strict control (if not public ownership) of 
monopolies.”31  In other words, although the Progressive Era is 
identified as roughly the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
it must be understood as the continuation of political conflict that 
significantly predates reformist political activism. 
C. Historians on Progressivism 
Historians’ descriptions of progressivism differ sharply, at least 
in part because many who claimed to be progressive were only 
pretending to be so, and because individual, business, and 
collective interests all influenced and benefited from progressive 
reforms.  In the 1920s and 30s, historians described the Progressive 
Era as “the successful culmination of a long just struggle by ‘the 
people’ against big business.”32  However, this ignored the vast 
commercial and corporate benefits that resulted from progressive 
causes; businesses continued to make money and corporations 
continued to increase in size even when incorporating regulatory 
changes.33  In the 1950s, it was argued that progressivism was 
partially responsible for American entry into World War I because 
progressivism sought to “extend democracy and to prevent war 
from occurring again,”34 but this too only tells part of the story. 
Despite its socialist and populist roots, some historians argue 
that progressivism was not a significant change in national outlook 
at all.  They argue that America has always lacked significant 
ideological conflict since all Americans, liberal and conservative 
alike, are disciples of John Locke.35  Instead, they suggest, 
progressives were merely “defenders of the genteel tradition . . . 
defending Victorian beliefs in absolute morality, manners, and 
culture from the new intellectual rebels.”36  However, this approach 
 
 31. Caine, supra note 18, at 31. 
 32. Anderson, supra note 17, at 427. 
 33. McCormick, supra note 14, at 251. 
 34. Anderson, supra note 17, at 430. 
 35. This is a questionable assertion.  While it is true that American political 
theory is largely Lockean, it is unclear that it is universally and solely so, especially 
amongst those who seek reform.  The pessimistic liberalism of Hobbes tends to 
govern international relations, especially post September 11, 2001, and Rousseau’s 
naturalism was likely an important element in nineteenth-century 
transcendentalism.  Furthermore, it is unclear whether adherence to Mill’s 
account of liberty, for example, is a de facto adherence to Locke or simply Millian 
in itself. 
 36. Anderson, supra note 17, at 437. 
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runs afoul of what is likely the most dominant view.  Famously, after 
considering a variety of definitions of progressivism, Peter Filene 
offered “An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement’”: “It is time 
to tear off the familiar label [of progressivism] and, thus liberated 
from its prejudice, see the history between 1890 and 1920 for what 
it was—ambiguous, inconsistent, moved by agenda and forces more 
complex than a progressive movement.”37  A few years later, 
however, Daniel Rodgers labels Filene’s approach “a pluralistic 
reading of progressive politics,” and declares it simply another 
questionable interpretation.38 
D. Contemporary Issues in Progressive Theory 
As ought to be clear, what it means to be progressive, at least 
historically, is very much a muddle.  Whereas contemporary 
progressive attitudes seem, at first blush, to be more focused, one 
cannot help notice that even today’s progressives neglect to offer a 
coherent account of their core philosophy: the term progressive 
remains undefined.  This lack of definition is only further 
complicated by progressivism’s de facto role as the opposition to the 
contemporary mainstream; progressivism is identified more often 
by what it is not than by what it is.  For example, Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger and Cornel West, in a 1998 article in The Nation 
titled “Progressive Politics and What Lies Ahead,” call for an 
“institutional experimentalism,” the purpose of which is to counter 
the “rigid ideological grids” of past progressivism that “overlook the 
complexity and experimental impulse of American life.”39  It is 
unclear what rigidity they refer to, although they likely mean the 
unwillingness to compromise that many would suggest 
characterizes the left.40 
Once again, West and Unger never define the progressive 
outlook.  The closest they come is their observation that  
progressives, if not yet many of their fellow Americans, see 
problems with how money and moneyed interests exert an 
 
 37. Peter G. Filene, An Obituary for “The Progressive Movement”, 22 AM. Q. 20, 34 
(1970). 
 38. Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113, 114 
(1982). 
 39. Roberto Mangabeira Unger & Cornel West, Progressive Politics and What 
Lies Ahead, THE NATION, Nov. 23, 1998, at 11. 
 40. It was precisely his willingness to compromise that made many on the left 
dissatisfied with President Bill Clinton. 
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inordinate influence upon the outcome of elections and 
the direction of policy, an influence occasionally 
sanctified by the judiciary as if the ability of money to talk, 
magnifying the voices of the few, crowding out the voices 
of the many, were a principle rather than a wrong.41 
This description echoes some of the progressive assertions of 
the early twentieth century: the corrupting influence of money and 
big business on American politics and the exclusion of individual 
non-moneyed voices in the political process.  More regulation and 
more grassroots participation is once again the clarion call of the 
progressive. 
For our purposes, it is worth investigating progressivism in a 
legal context as well.  Many of Unger and West’s sentiments are 
shared by David Kairys in his introduction to the revised edition of 
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique.42  Once again, offering no 
clear definition what it means to be progressive, Kairys 
distinguishes his approach from “traditional jurisprudence”43 and 
“mainstream legal thought,”44 hoping to locate his method in 
opposition to the methodology of legal adjudication and research.45 
Kairys first attacks the idealized decision-making process that 
governs the establishment and practice of law.  Second, he calls for 
democratic reform to allow for more popular participation in 
political decision making, particularly in those decisions that affect 
the courts.  Third, he rejects the notion that either the law or the 
state are “neutral, value-free arbiters, independent of and 
unaffected by social and economic relations, political forces and 
cultural phenomena.”46  Fourth, he calls for a reexamination of the 
legitimization function for law, arguing that “the law’s ultimate 
mechanism for control and enforcement is institutional violence, 
but it protects the dominant system of social and power relations 
against political and ideological as well as physical challenges.”47 
Kairys’ rich and interesting discussion shares with Unger and 
West’s article numerous themes that have been passed on from the 
earlier twentieth-century progressives: the passion for reform, the 
 
 41. Unger & West, supra note 39, at 12. 
 42. DAVID KAIRYS, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
1 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). 
 43. Id. at 9. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 6. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/1
1. WEINSTEIN - RC.DOC 11/21/2006  12:37:10 PM 
2006] ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM PROGRESSIVE 11 
call for a more direct democracy, the appeal of populism, and an 
understanding of the political and legal process as the adjudication 
of disputes among particular competing groups.48  Yet Kairys’ 
introduction adds a few new themes to the mix.  In particular, his 
rejection of abstract contextless procedure and his attack on the 
(in Kairys’ view) false claim of political neutrality that characterizes 
legal and political procedure.49 
In many ways, these two new critiques are extensions of the 
older concerns.  A political procedure that adjudicates between 
groups cannot be neutral; it must look at the particulars of 
circumstance.  Furthermore, any reformist movement cannot be 
purely theoretical.  It must look at actual circumstances and 
determine how to convert institutions from one form to another. 
The remainder of this essay will examine these and several 
other progressive themes in themselves.  Rather than continue the 
historical focus of this first section, I shift to a philosophical 
investigation of the meaning of neutrality and group relations, and 
of the relationship between morality and the free market.  
However, I shall begin with the proverbial elephant in the room: 
the concept of progress itself. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS 
A. Worldviews Before “Progress” 
Progress as it is currently understood is primarily an 
enlightenment concept. Throughout most of the human 
experience, people regarded history as either static or cyclical.  
Parents expected their children’s lives to be very much like their 
own, and basic knowledge remained the same over many 
generations.  The archetypical modern experience of children 
rejecting their parents’ attitudes as naïve, inadequate, or corrupt is 
the product of a rapidly changing world; it is not human nature 
manifested through inevitable adolescent rebellion. 
When radical change did take place, it was usually viewed as 
the result of accident, the consequence of a particular political will, 
or the effect of intervention by a divine figure.  In fact, change, 
when it did occur, was more apt to be seen as regressive than 
 
 48. See id. at 1–7. 
 49. See id. 
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progressive; things got worse, not better.  The expulsion from Eden 
is a primary example of a story glorifying an unsullied past.  Every 
day takes people farther away from perfection, this worldview tells 
us, and redemption is only possible outside the confines of human 
history.  One may be redeemed in the afterlife, but in nature, the 
will fails, the body deteriorates, and human society collapses. 
Classical Greek thought also assumed the degeneration of 
human society.  The Greeks spoke of a Golden Age, a time without 
strife or toil.  Hesiod described history as moving from the age of 
gold to the age of iron; Plato saw society as degenerating along 
political organizational lines—from aristocracy, to timocracy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and then, ultimately, despotism.50  Aristotle 
suggested that human nature was stagnant if not wicked, and that 
change in the political order in itself was undesirable.51  The Greeks 
saw society is a fragile bulwark against chaos. 
B. The Earliest Uses of the Term 
The word progress is etymologically Latin, a combination of 
pro and gradi.  Literally, it means to walk forward.  The first use of 
the term is likely by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura.  In his 
description of humans distinguishing themselves over time from 
the beasts of nature, he writes: “practice and the experience of the 
unresisting mind have taught mankind as they have progressed 
from point to point.”52 
For the Roman poet, however, growth is no more; we may have 
progressed but we do not progress any longer.  As far as Lucretius 
was concerned, whatever advancement humanity had managed was 
already complete.  Only the possibility of destruction was ever 
present.53  Progress, which contemporary minds understand as a 
continuous movement forward that provides society and inquiry 
with direction, was absent from his picture of the future. 
This is not to suggest that contemporary visions of progress 
must offer a narrative that is uninterrupted, without temporary 
setbacks, or that is absolutely secure.  Instead, progress can be 
complicated and is often fragile.  The twentieth century is a prime 
 
 50. Plato, The Republic, Book VIII. 
 51. Aristotle, Politics, Book II. 
 52. Sidney B. Fay, The Idea of Progress, 52 AM. HIST. REV. 231, 234 (1947) 
(quoting TITUS LUCRETIUS CARUS, DE RERUM NATURA, Book V, ll., 1452–53 (H.A.J. 
Munro ed., London 1920)). 
 53. James H.S. Bossard, The Concept of Progress, 10 SOC. FORCES 5, 6 (1931). 
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example of a time fraught with unlearned lessons and rife with 
degeneration, but one could certainly make the case that 
significant progress was made in the midst of the century’s horrors. 
During times of significant growth and complexity, progress 
can be particularly hard to spot.  As Willson H. Coates writes: 
“Since there has always been in periods of rapid social change a 
dual process of breaking down and building up, it is possible to 
regard the disintegration of moral and social traditions as a 
necessary part of the moral and social reconstruction which the 
twentieth century demands.”54  In other words, despite the 
destruction of institutions and the chaos and barbarism of the 
twentieth century, a bird’s eye view—perhaps the only view that 
permits an unfettered glimpse of progress—allows one to see 
advancement: “Progress may be no less progress for its being 
precarious, for it has never been, and by definition can never be, 
identified with stasis.”55 
The intellectual shift leading to the contemporary concept of 
progress began during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
with the introduction of the modern scientific method and 
attitude.  Science assumed predictability and coherent explanation. 
To describe nature was to describe logos: “man had to see that it was 
not fortune but general causes that govern the world.”56 
In 1566, for example, Jean Bodin argued against the classical 
image of a golden age.  Summing up Bodin’s argument, Sidney B. 
Fay said: “the powers of nature have always remained the same; and 
. . . it would be illogical to suppose that nature could at one time 
produce the men and conditions postulated by the Golden Age 
theory, and not produce them at a later time.”57  Bodin argued that 
it is human attitudes and experiences that fluctuate over time: 
History . . . depends largely on the will of men, which is 
always changing: every day new customs, new laws, new 
institutions come into being, and also new errors, 
resulting in a series of oscillations.  Rise is followed by fall, 
and fall by rise.  But, on the whole, through the series of 
oscillations, there has been a gradual ascent from the time 
when men lived like wild beasts to the social order of 
 
 54. Willson H. Coates, What is Progress?, 45 J. PHIL. 67, 69 (1948). 
 55. Id. at 71. 
 56. Bossard, supra note 53, at 8. 
 57. Fay, supra note 52, at 235. 
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sixteenth century Europe.58 
This approach to nature is preeminently modern: the laws of 
nature are timeless, and, as such, different outcomes are the result 
of human intervention, not a fluctuating physics.  Yet, like 
Lucretius, Bodin paid little attention to the future. The 
development that he described was the progress that led to his age, 
not from it.  It would be another sixty years before Francis Bacon 
would introduce the teleological optimism of the modern scientific 
method: explication of the gradual and intentional forward 
movement that is necessary to overcome human error in its four 
dominant forms.59  Bacon’s systematic account of an error-free 
empiricism recognizes that scientific knowledge was not complete 
when it articulated all that was currently known.60 
Bacon writes of scientific revolutions and of knowledge beyond 
the imagination of his contemporaries, familiar tools of progress to 
the modern mind.  However, the New Atlantis was postulated by 
Bacon as being physically and not temporally far away from the 
England that he knew.61  Bacon, along with Bodin, was irrevocably 
attached to the classical texts as authorities, and both thinkers 
preserved the place of providence in the unfolding of historical 
events.62  None of these attitudes jibe with contemporary notions of 
progress. 
It was Descartes who detached modern scientific thinking from 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, in 30 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD 107 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952) (1620).  Bacon classified errors 
as stemming from four sources, he terms them idols.  They are: Idols of the Cave, 
limitations of any given individual caused by experience, culture, or allegiances to 
ideologies or false systems; Idols of the Tribe, imperfections in human nature such 
as the unreliability of the senses; Idols of the Marketplace, mistakes caused by 
interaction with others, specifically resulting from the limitations of language; and, 
Idols of the Theater, similar to the Idols of the Cave, errors caused by complex 
systems that inaccurately mimic the truth.  Here he had in mind false 
philosophical systems. 
 60. Id.  Building off of recent discoveries, he writes: “There is therefore much 
ground for hoping that there are still laid up in the womb of nature many secrets 
of excellent use, having no affinity or parallelism with anything that is now known, 
but lying entirely out of the beat of the imagination, which have not yet been 
found out.  They too no doubt will some time or other, in the course and 
revolution of many ages, come to light of themselves, just as the others did; only by 
the method of which we are now treating they can be speedily and suddenly and 
simultaneously presented and anticipated.”  Id. at 128–29. 
 61. Rush Welter, The Idea of Progress in America: An Essay in Ideas and Method, 
16 J. HIST. IDEAS 401, 402 (1955). 
 62. Fay, supra note 52, at 235. 
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the authority of the classics.63  His famous foundationalism 
permitted each inquirer to reach the moment of the indubitable.  
Cogito Ergo Sum was as much a break from the past as it was the 
reaffirmation of science as he understood it.  One did not need 
Aristotle to establish certainty; one needed only the rationality 
present in all mature minds.  Descartes provided the contemporary 
world with intellectual tools that functioned independently of the 
divine.  His famous Meditations on First Philosophy provides a 
universally accessible foundation for scientific knowledge that 
allows individuals to collectively build, free of doubt, on the 
discoveries of others.  Purely rational inquiry can, for Descartes, be 
free from error, and the sciences can therefore be regarded as a 
reliable source of increasing knowledge.64 
Consider, in summation, the following account of the 
historical prerequisites for the concept of progress: 
First to appear was a monistic and synthetic view of 
history, as opposed to that cyclical view which had 
characterized late Greek and Roman thought; this was 
provided by the Hebraic and Christian assumption of a 
long-range meaning and direction in historic change.  
Second of these prerequisites to appear was a willingness 
after the first flush of Renaissance classicism to turn to 
natural facts rather than ancient classics for an 
understanding of the contemporary world; in times such a 
willingness would imply that the present world was quite 
as important as the past, and might even have progressed 
beyond it in knowledge.  A third factor, also a function of 
the Renaissance, was secularization of thought, which 
would ultimately enable men to break free of the 
Christian view of history so far as it tended to deprecate 
progress in this world in favor of that to be achieved by 
transition to another.  Coupled with it was a growing 
belief in the immutable laws of nature, which by 
definition excluded the arbitrary workings of a divine 
 
 63. See Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, 
in 31 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 41 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. 
Ross trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1637) [hereinafter Descartes, 
Discourse on Method]; Rene Descartes, Meditation on First Philosophy, in 31 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 69 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1641) [hereinafter Descartes, Meditation]. 
 64. Descartes, Meditations, supra note 63, at 75–81.  It is therefore quite 
appropriate, as Fay reminds us, that Descartes’s Discourse on Method was originally 
titled “The Project of a Universal Science Which Can Elevate Our Nature to its 
Highest Perfection.”  Fay, supra note 52, at 235. 
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Providence from the course of historic development, and 
thus made progress if it existed at all implicit in history 
itself.65 
C. The Eighteenth Century Conception of Progress 
Progress is not a simple idea.  It requires a background culture 
and a network of social, epistemological, and metaphysical 
assumptions that provide explanations of the human place in the 
world, the nature and limits of inquiry, the role (or lack thereof) of 
the divine, and, of course, a complex and sophisticated account of 
the nature of history itself.  It also requires background 
conceptions of justice and the good life in that a history that 
progresses must progress towards something.  The Enlightenment 
identified what that something might be.66 
For eighteenth-century thinkers, beginning with the influential 
writings of Turgot and Condorcet,  progress includes social, 
political, and moral components.  It was not just scientific 
knowledge that advanced as history unfolded.  The human 
character and circumstance bettered itself.  In A Philosophical Review 
of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind, Turgot postulated that 
human society moved back and forth from barbarism to 
civilization, the latter being characterized by the centrality of 
reason while the former is more closely identified with thought 
governed by superstition.67  While still cyclical, in a certain sense, 
Turgot contributes a stage theory that will be of immense 
importance to Adam Smith and his commentators (especially 
Marx), and supplies the essential notion that one stage can be 
identified as morally better than another.  Without such gradations, 
progress becomes indistinguishable from chronology.  The 
teleology inherent in the advancement of history assumes that the 
closer one gets to the goal of history, the higher the moral value of 
the current moment is. 
Ultimately, though, is it the Marquis de Condorcet who offers 
 
 65. Welter, supra note 61, at 401–02 (citing J.B. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: 
AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH (1920)). 
 66. It is worth interjecting that even this essay presumes that a description of 
progress in terms of progression is the most informative means of communicating 
the narrative of meaning behind a specific concept. 
 67. A. R. J. Turgot, Second discours en Sorbonne. Sur les progrès successifs 
de l'esprit humain, in 2 ŒUVRES DE TURGOT 597–611 (Eugène Daire & Hippolyte 
Dussard eds., Guillaumin Libraire 1844) (1750). 
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us the most dramatic account of moral progress, placing its 
identification at the center of his treatise, The Progress of the Human 
Mind.  The “aim” of this work, he writes, is to show that “nature has 
set no term to the perfection of the human faculties; that the 
perfection of man is truly indefinite; and that the progress of this 
perfectibility, from now onwards independent of any power that 
may wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration of the 
globe upon which nature has cast us. This progress will no doubt 
vary in speed, but it will never be reversed.”68 
Condorcet’s comment that progress can never be retrograde 
makes explicit its adherence to the principles of nature.  It is not 
simply that forward movement describes the execution of these 
principles.  Progress is itself one of the principles; that the human 
mind progresses is part of its nature. 
The concept of “progress”—as it developed through the 
Enlightenment—is collective in two important ways.  The first is 
that these thinkers refer to progress as a monolithic activity: either 
humanity progresses or it does not.  There is not any room for 
more sophisticated claims such as, “humanity has progressed in its 
respect for the individual person, but it has not progressed in its 
attitude towards women.”69 
The second way in which progress is collective is more 
troubling for the American progressive agenda.  Humanity 
progresses as a whole, but individuals might not.70  One might 
suggest that the human condition has bettered significantly—
humans now have the technological capacity for shelter, advanced 
medicine, and high-speed communication—but that does not 
 
 68. ANTOINE-NICOLAS DE CONDORCET, SKETCH FOR A HISTORICAL PICTURE OF 
THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND 4 (June Barraclough trans., Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson 1955) (1795). 
 69. This inadequacy would correct itself in the beginning of the twentieth 
century during which progress’s “concrete application and its decentralization . . . 
[were identified] with differing kinds of change.”  Bossard, supra note 53, at 11.  
Given two world wars, the depression, and the failure of the League of Nations, 
“civilization seemed to be turned back several centuries.”  Fay, supra note 52, at 
240.  There was a renewed sense of allegiance to Turgot’s cycle-theory of progress, 
and “more attention was focused on the stages where [history] halted or slipped 
back.”  Id.  Science seemed to advance significantly while morality seemed to 
degenerate.  Progress had to be compartmentalized. 
 70. This is not to suggest that education cannot make a person morally 
better; such a concept was central to many Enlightenment thinkers’ systems.  
Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, Hegel would argue that certain “world 
historical” individuals (Alexander the Great, Napoleon, etc.) do move history 
forward. 
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mean that even the majority of people actually see the benefits of 
these advances.  Vast numbers of people have no access to shelter, 
medicine, or the technologies of communication, and, as such, the 
forward progress of those who do might actually make them worse 
off rather than better.71  Immanuel Kant, the paradigmatic 
enlightenment philosopher and the philosophical progenitor of 
not only the dominant contemporary political theory, but also the 
role of subjectivity in the modern experience, will help us to focus 
on this notion of collectivity in more detail.72 
D. Kant on History and Progress 
In An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant 
identifies the purpose of human history as enlightenment, or 
“man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.”73  According to 
Kant, the motto of enlightenment is “Sapere aude! [Dare to know]” 
or, “Have courage to use your own reason!”74  Reason is the key to 
freedom, although freedom is limited in the Kantian sense.  It is 
not Isaiah Berlin’s liberty, but rather, “the public use of one’s 
reason.”  According to Kant, “it alone can bring about 
enlightenment among men.”75 
For Kant, freedom is scholarly.  It denotes the ability to 
criticize when one speaks in one’s own voice, but does not entitle a 
person to speak critically when he or she represents a particular 
office.76  For example, a clergyman must teach catechism on the 
pulpit even if he works as a scholar to challenge the doctrine via 
theological journals.77  For Kant, to deny this scholarly freedom is 
 
 71. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 72. This requires some explanation.  As we will see in section three, Kant’s 
moral and political theories lie at the core of contemporary liberal political 
philosophy, the most influential proponent of which is John Rawls.  In a related 
but different area, Kant is largely responsible for the subjective turn in modern 
epistemology.  Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason argues that the mind actively filters 
information in order to understand it.  This subjectivism is a radical departure 
from the epistemologists who came before him. 
 73. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?, in ON 
HISTORY 3, 3 (Lewis White Beck ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1963) (1784). 
 74. Id. at 3. 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. This may not seem like much, but in fact, in contemporary politics, we are 
often in danger of losing this freedom. For example, corporate officials are often 
restricted from making political statements because even if they disavow 
association with their employers, the risk of associating a particular company with 
a controversial position is too great. 
 77. Kant, supra note 73, at 6. 
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to bind people to the present time.  It is “to shut off all further 
enlightenment from the human race,” and is “a crime against 
humanity,” because “the proper destination . . . [of humanity] . . . 
lies precisely in this progress.”78  Kant adds by way of explanation: 
“For himself (and only for a short time) a man may postpone 
enlightenment in what he ought to know, but to renounce it for 
posterity is to injure and trample on the rights of mankind.”79  
Thus, we have a duty to pursue our own improvement, not for 
ourselves, but for its universal importance.  Each of us is a 
contributor to the human project.80  The nature and limitations of 
this contribution are elaborated upon in his Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, published the same year.81  
He explains: 
Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical 
point of view, concerning the freedom of the will, 
certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like 
every other natural event are determined by universal 
laws.  However obscure their causes, history, which is 
concerned with narrating these appearances, permits us 
to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the 
human will in the large, we may be able to discern a 
regular movement in it, and that what seems complex and 
chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the 
 
 78. Id. at 6–8. 
 79. Id. at 8. 
 80. Kant concludes the essay by writing, 
But only one who is himself enlightened, is not afraid of shadows, and 
has a numerous and well-disciplined army to assure public peace, can say: 
“Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only obey!”  A 
republic could not dare say such a thing.  Here is shown a strange and 
unexpected trend in human affairs in which almost everything, looked at 
in the large, is paradoxical.  A greater degree of civil freedom appears 
advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places 
inescapable limitations upon it.  A lower degree of civil freedom, on the 
contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to 
his full capacity.  As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the 
seed for which she most tenderly cares—the propensity and vocation to 
free thinking—this gradually works back upon the character of the 
people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom; 
finally, it affects the principles of government, which finds it to its 
advantage to treat men, who are now more than machines, in accordance 
with their dignity. 
Id. at 10. 
 81. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of 
View, in ON HISTORY 11 (Lewis White Black ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1963) 
(1784). 
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standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady 
and progressive though slow evolution of its original 
endowment.82 
The essay on cosmopolitan history consists of nine theses 
describing the relationship between human action and history, and 
includes elaborations on their meaning.  Ultimately, the theses lead 
to the goal of nature, which is “the achievement of a universal civic 
society which administers law among men.”83  This is “the most 
difficult and the last [problem] to be solved by mankind”:84 
The history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the 
realization of Nature’s secret plan to bring forth a 
perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which 
the capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also 
bring forth that external relation among states which is 
perfectly adequate to this end.85 
The relevant difficulty for our discussion lies in the second 
thesis: “In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those 
natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to 
be fully developed only in the race, not in the individual.”86  Kant 
argues that reason itself progresses, but because it: 
requires trial, practice, and instruction in order gradually 
to progress from one level of insight to another . . . a 
single man would have to live excessively long in order to 
learn to make full use of all his natural capacities.  Since 
Nature has set only a short period for his life, she needs a 
perhaps unreckonable series of generations, each of 
which passes its own enlightenment to its successor in 
order finally to bring the seeds of enlightenment to that 
degree of development in our race which is completely 
suitable to Nature’s purpose.87 
This, in a nutshell, is the modern conception of progress.  
Each generation contributes to the progress of the whole by being 
one link in a chain.  While individuals may experience the fruit of 
improvement along the way, they will never achieve the telos that 
drives progress. 
On its own, this seems optimistic, but more detail reveals the 
 
 82. Id. at 11. 
 83. Id. at 16. 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. Id. at 21. 
 86. Id. at 13. 
 87. Id. 
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tension implicit in the procedure Kant outlines: it is human 
antagonism that drives history forward.  Humans have both social 
and unsocial elements in their personalities.  A person wants to be 
in society “because in society he feels himself to be more than man, 
i.e., as more than the developed form of his natural capacities.”88  
Yet, at the same time, a person wants to be alone, “because he finds 
in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to 
have everything go according to his own wish.”89  Humans therefore 
live in conflict with one another, negotiating, as Berlin would later 
call it, their freedom from others and their freedom to 
actualization that can only occur in social circumstances.  Kant’s 
vision is nowhere as extreme as Hobbes’s war of all against all; 
nevertheless, the human experience is still one of opposition.90 
Again, we see the modern notion of progress.  Conflict and 
individual desires bring improvement because the competition for 
goods and the tension between individuals are the means by which 
individuals improve their powers.  This improvement moves the 
human race forward.  Particular people win or lose, but collectively, 
history ensures that the human race wins overall. 
E. Progress During and After the Nineteenth Century 
For Kant, progress contributes to the realization of human 
potential.  At the core of his account is a glorification of the human 
capacity.  Enlightenment for Kant is the point where humankind 
can finally do whatever it was that it was intended to do.  
 
 88. Id. at 15. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Kant writes: 
This opposition it is which awakens all his powers, brings him to conquer 
his inclination to laziness and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and 
avarice, to achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but 
from whom he cannot withdraw.  Thus are taken the first true steps from 
barbarism to culture, which consists in the social worth of man; thence 
gradually develop all talents, and taste is refined; through continued 
enlightenment the beginnings are laid for a way of thought which can in 
time convert the coarse, natural disposition for moral discrimination into 
definite practical principles, and thereby change a society of men driven 
together by their natural feelings into a moral whole . . . . Thanks be to 
Nature, then, for the incompatibility, for heartless competitive vanity, for 
the insatiable desire to possess and to rule!  Without them, all the 
excellent natural capacities of humanity would forever sleep, 
undeveloped.  Man wishes concord; but Nature knows better what is 
good for the race; she wills discord.   
Id. at 15–16. 
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Nineteenth-century theorists modified this meaning.  For Hegel, 
historical progress is aimed at achieving freedom, but his 
conception of freedom is inherently tied together with access to 
truth, universal culture, and political and metaphysical identity.  
The end of history for Hegel is Absolute Spirit: collective self-
actualization, self-aware total knowledge of the whole as a 
collectivity.91 
Marx would challenge Hegel, arguing that his forerunner’s 
conception of freedom did little for the individual and that his 
conception of history was so focused on principle that it ignored 
particular events.92  He would substitute communism—political 
equality, universal political participation, and true command of 
one’s own labor—for Kant’s enlightenment.  John Stuart Mill 
would emphasize a different area of Kant’s essay, arguing that 
political liberty is necessary for free inquiry.93  Darwin’s biological 
theories would weave the notion of progress into even the 
seemingly accidental (he provides the security of providence 
without the necessity of the divine: we are, by nature, a species that 
advances).  The pragmatists—C.S. Pierce, John Dewey, and 
others—would develop a progressivist theory of truth that defined 
truth in part as that which the community of inquiry would 
converge upon in the long run.94 
All of these variations on Kant and his commentators, and on 
Condorcet, Smith, and Turgot, become elements within the 
negotiations of the American Progressive Era.  In The Idea of Progress 
in America, Rush Welter shows clearly that in America, during the 
nineteenth century, “both ‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’ subscribed 
to the doctrine of a systematic and presumably perpetual 
 
 91. Hegel, as an idealist, saw reason as the ultimate reality, so physical 
distinction between individuals were of lesser concern in his system.  At most, he 
was concerned about the interaction of peoples—nations the interaction of which 
drove history forward. 
 92. See Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 2d ed. 
1978) (1844). 
 93. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 
Penguin Books 1974) (1859). 
 94. Herbert Spencer would “identify progress with evolution.  Organic 
evolution is organized progress and the law of organic progress is the law of all 
progress.”  Bossard, supra note 53, at 9.  Spencer extended “‘the survival of the 
fittest’ to biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics,” creating “the gigantic 
Synthetic Philosophy which was to explain the development of the universe.”  Fay, 
supra note 52, at 237. 
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improvement of the human estate,” but that there was significant 
satisfaction in the way things were: “progress . . . would be a 
continuation of the present.”95  As Welter explains, during that 
period, almost universally, for Americans, “the United States . . . 
both had progressed and was progress.”96  Yet, at the same time, 
Americans regarded their nation as “an experiment.”97  They 
appreciated change, but wanted it “orderly,” against the 
revolutionary roots of the experiment itself.98 
Before the Progressive Era, then, Americans rejected Kant’s 
presumption of conflict: 
On the classic European view, the conflict of opinions 
produce truth; in the light of the idea of progress truth 
will be constantly accruing new meanings.  But in the 
United States neither conflict nor innovation was deemed 
necessary.  Indeed all that was necessary, according to a 
commonly held view, was the education of all children in 
the accepted truths of their parents.99 
As we saw in the first section, this approach changed in the 
Progressive Era, and many of these tensions can be witnessed in the 
conflict between the different reformists that epitomized the 
period.  If society is made up of different groups, every group 
might not be as capable of teaching the dominant values, values 
that are no longer universally agreed upon.  Instead, groups must 
fight for their values to be realized and they may therefore have to 
rely on the government to protect their ability to do so. 
Contemporary progressives are still struggling with these 
nuances, especially the tension between the collective nature of 
progress and the need for advancement of the individual.  What 
makes a collective and how close to the individual person do the 
benefits of progress penetrate?  Is collectivity economic, ethnic, 
religious, or gendered?  Are the needs of an individual group 
member subordinate to the needs of the group in general?  To 
what extent can the law address social realities?  These issues, as we 
have seen, are touched upon in Kairys’ introduction to The Politics 
of Law: A Progressive Critique.  They become some of the central foci 
of American politics during the second half of the twentieth 
 
 95. Rush Welter, The Idea of Progress in America: An Essay in Ideas and Method, 
16 J. HIST. IDEAS 401, 401, 404 (1955). 
 96. Id. at 406. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 410. 
 99. Id. at 413. 
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century. 
III.  CONTEXT AND BUREAUCRACY 
In this section, I focus on the use of an ideal as a guiding force 
in progressive politics.  As we have seen, in the introduction to The 
Politics of Law, David Kairys attacks the idealized decision-making 
process that governs the establishment and practice of law.  He 
questions whether the state can ever be neutral or value-free, with a 
legal system independent of social, political, economic, or cultural 
forces.  Progressives, it seems, regard individual circumstance as 
relevant to political decision making, and they acknowledge that 
the current political structure and its inequities affect these 
decisions.  The playing field is not equal, a contemporary 
progressive would likely argue, and since this inequality influences 
public and legal policy, one can fairly question the legitimacy of the 
current legal system. 
The fact that money and special interests significantly 
influence American governance is so widely accepted that 
commenting on it has reached the level of platitude.100  Kairys’ 
concerns cut deeper.  He asks, not only whether finance affects 
realpolitik, but whether social and economic inequalities are 
interwoven into the very core of the American vision of justice.  
Does ignoring particularities subvert the pursuit of justice at the 
outset? 
A. John Rawls’s Proceduralism 
Kairys’ concerns are shared by many in political philosophy, 
and his comments contribute to a debate that has reached its 
zenith in the last thirty years.  At the epicenter of this discussion lies 
the work of the late Harvard Professor John Rawls, whose 1971 
book A Theory of Justice101 renewed interest in political philosophy, 
moving it from a stagnant sub-field to perhaps the most active and 
vibrant area of philosophy today.  The contrast between Rawls’s two 
most important books102 highlights precisely what any legal system 
 
 100. At the same time, there is a parallel grassroots movement aimed at 
circumventing this control of business.  The internet-based political action group 
MoveOn.org is, perhaps, the most successful. 
 101. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) (1971). 
 102. I have in mind Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.  See 
generally id.; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. 1996). 
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gains or loses by prioritizing neutrality and an idealized reasoning 
structure, factors that we must consider if we are to take Kairys’ 
critique seriously. 
Rawls is a proceduralist.  In other words, he believes that 
focusing on the process of governing rather than the people who 
are to be governed is the best way to treat individuals equally.  This 
is an outgrowth of Kant’s claim that only ethical precepts which 
consider reason alone are truly moral.  Categorical principles reach 
universal conclusions, and if one’s act is moral in all circumstances, 
it is moral in any circumstance.103 
When a political system is built in accordance with the 
categorical imperative, as Kant famously calls it, moral agents enter 
into membership in the Kingdom of Ends: a just political structure 
that treats its members as ends-in-themselves.  In more 
contemporary terms, systems of justice that follow Kant’s model 
articulate rights and duties that apply to all people in all situations 
so that they can be equally and justly applied to individual people 
in specific circumstances.  Each person, therefore, is politically 
equal to every other and fully consenting and participatory in the 
governance process. 
Rawls struggled with all of this as early as 1958.  In his ground-
breaking paper Justice as Fairness, he considers justice, not as “a 
virtue of particular persons” but rather, as a “virtue of social 
institutions.”104  He writes that principles of justice “are regarded as 
formulating restrictions as to how practices may define positions 
and offices, and assign thereto powers and liabilities, rights and 
duties.”105  In philosophical terms, Rawls prioritizes the right over 
the good, or the legal process over both people’s particular aims in 
life and the state’s notion of what makes a good person.  Despite its 
liberal character,106 the institution comes first, and the individual 
 
 103. According to Kant, all people, by nature of their own reason, can assent 
to a universal moral rule.  In doing so, they act out of duty rather than simple 
inclination, and, in return, they are treated with equal and absolute respect (but 
even if they were not, Kant would argue, moral actors are still morally obligated to 
follow the rule since it is the right thing to do). 
 104. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47–48 (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 1999). 
 105. Id. 
 106. The term liberal, unless otherwise indicated, refers to the classical liberal 
tradition: a society is liberal if it prioritizes the individual over the collective and 
preserves an area of human life that cannot be infringed upon by the state.  In 
American politics, both Democrats and Republicans are liberal in this sense. 
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later.107  As he wrote almost half a century later, “[n]either political 
philosophy nor justice as fairness is . . . applied moral 
philosophy.”108  For Rawls, to understand what people want to be, 
one must first understand the institutions that enumerate their 
possibilities.  Freedom is first and foremost access; liberty is 
primarily institutional possibility.  Like the progressives, Rawls sees 
government intervention as a key to individual liberty. 
Rawls’s words are representative of their time.  Whatever he 
meant by individuality and personal freedom was mired in a world 
whose politics were about to change.  Immersed in the cold war, 
political philosophy of the 1950s was informed by World War II, 
McCarthyism, and the Korean War.  Rawls’s essay does not 
anticipate the cultural conflict that would soon refocus his ideas.109 
B. Bureaucracy in A Theory of Justice 
By 1971, Rawls made identity conflict a central component in 
his work.  He was seeking, along with many in the United States, a 
mechanism for erasing racial and ethnic politics from political 
decision-making procedures.110  In Theory, he presents a full-scale 
proceduralist conception of justice, one in which the proper 
functioning of institutions guarantees both just circumstances and 
necessary access to good. 
For Rawls, the key to justice is found in the formation of the 
political structure.  He argues that the rules of justice—the 
principles that outline the goals and structures of political 
institutions—ought to be decided upon in a situation of total 
fairness, otherwise the principles themselves will be inherently 
 
 107. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls offers two reasons for his 
prioritizing the “basic structure” of institutions.  See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).  First, because political theory 
needs, “an institutional division of labor between principles required to preserve 
background justice and principles that apply directly to particular transactions 
between individuals and associations,” id. at 54; and, second, because of its 
“profound and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its institutions.”  
Id. at 55. 
 108. Id.  at 14. 
 109. The civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, the construction of the 
Berlin Wall, and the mainstreaming of ethnic studies may possibly have been in 
the air in the 1950’s, but they were far from being realized.  They are, however, 
essential to A Theory of Justice. 
 110. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999) (chapter 2, “The 
Feminist Critique of Liberalism,” is particularly relevant to this point).  Whether 
Rawls is fully conscious of gender difference is a matter of debate. 
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corrupt; he is trying to avoid criticisms of the sort Kairys puts forth 
from the start. 
Building on the social contract tradition and adding elements 
from Kant’s ethics, Rawls postulates a hypothetical ideal decision-
making procedure called “the original position” in which all 
interlocutors are placed under a “veil of ignorance” and are 
therefore made unaware of their particular circumstances: they do 
not know their own social status, abilities, ethnicities, genders, 
capabilities, or personal aims.111  Instead they are encouraged to 
recognize that whatever the worst social position turns out to be, 
they might end up being in it.  For Rawls, only by being ignorant of 
one’s own personal circumstance can one be truly impartial.  
Without this ignorance, Rawls implies, people will necessarily 
choose principles of justice that privilege their personal 
circumstance. 
Rawls argues that all people, so situated, will choose the same 
principles of justice, the same claim Kant makes about the 
categorical imperative.  This ensures not only equal respect, but 
universal consent.  The agents in the original position are 
essentially identical to one another and are adequate stand-ins for 
those who do not participate, since any person can be placed in the 
original position and will then consent to the same two 
principles.112  In other words, equal civil liberties cannot be 
compromised and equal opportunity must be cultivated in all cases 
unless their existence compromises the civil liberties established by 
the first principle. 
Rawls argues that in the original position, agents will 
necessarily choose institutions in which the lowest rung is the most 
beneficial of all possible lowest rungs; economic inequality is 
permissible only insofar as the inequality contributes to the 
increased well-being of the least fortunate.  He calls this the 
maximin principle, or the principle that seeks the maximum 
minimum position.113  Despite the vast range of social difference in 
 
 111. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 17–22. 
 112. In order of priority, the principles of justice are: 
(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. (2) Social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all. 
Id. at 60. 
 113. Id. at 152.  For example, imagine two societies, one egalitarian, one 
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the hierarchical society, Rawls argues that agents in the original 
position will still choose the hierarchical society because having the 
lowest rung at position w+1 is better than having it at w.  Upward 
mobility is not an issue; neither is a sense of community, and Rawls 
explicitly precludes envy as a motivating factor.114  Rawls only 
concerns himself with the worst-case scenario; he wants the worst 
off as well off as possible.  It is important to note that since no 
economic concerns can trump the basic liberties guaranteed by the 
first principle of justice, the concern that vast social inequalities will 
result in a limitation on the ability of the least well-off members of 
society to participate in governance is unfounded.  Such limitations 
would be regarded as interfering with the basic liberties and would 
preclude that possibility of such a social arrangement from being 
chosen by the members of the original position. 
We see already how Rawls struggles with many of the themes 
discussed by the progressives.  He is concerned about the least well-
off in society.  Additionally, he is seeking a way for universal 
participation in the formation of the principles of justice, yet he is 
also wedded to seeking a means by which the collective can 
intervene when regulation or intervention is required. 
Perhaps the two most problematic issues in Rawls’s theory are 
the ideal nature of the reasoning process and the aim for neutrality 
between people.  Taking the exact opposite position as Kairys, 
Rawls concludes that true justice can only exist in circumstances 
where the decision-making process governs each person precisely 
as it would any other, while context is rejected as a relevant factor 
in the establishment of the rules of justice.  Since, according to 
Rawls, ethnic, racial, or other such factors impair decision making, 
he suggests that the only fair move is to exclude them from 
consideration.115  Such characteristics are accidental, not essential, 
 
hierarchical.  Suppose that the status of every member of the egalitarian society is 
some level that I will call w, whereas the status of the members of the hierarchical 
society ranges from level w+1 to level w+100.  Here, w in this phrase means simply 
wellness.  I am using it as a composite for all those factors that influence quality of 
life in a society. This includes economic well-being, health, happiness, etc.  The 
nature of wellness is controversial and I wish to avoid that discussion for the time 
being.  I only use this in an attempt to illustrate Rawls’s maximin principle. 
 114. Rawls writes, “the most extreme disparities in wealth and income are 
allowed provided that the expectations of the least fortunate are raised to the 
slightest degree.  But at the same time similar inequalities favoring the more 
advantaged are forbidden when those in the worst position lose by the least 
amount.”  RAWLS, supra note 101, at 157. 
 115. Id. at 137–42. 
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in Rawls’s view of humanity, and are therefore irrelevant to political 
decision making. 
Of course, there is a major difference between Rawls’s 
approach and Kairys’ approach; whereas the scholars in The Politics 
of Law are working within a pre-existing and, perhaps, inherently 
flawed system, Rawls is working to create a new system that once 
established will hopefully avoid the flaws existent in our own. 
Nevertheless, his critics argued that human rationality was simply 
not possible in the original position, a criticism that echoes the 
critiques of neutrality and ideality leveled against contemporary 
legal procedure.  People cannot make decisions about what 
political circumstance is to be preferred if they have no sense of 
their own identity or goals.116  Reasoning requires a tradition and 
strong sense of self to have rational justification, otherwise what 
Rawls calls consent is really arbitrary preference. 
C. Liberalism and Neutrality 
The aftermath of A Theory of Justice is complicated (as is the 
book, the surface of which I have only grazed here).  Political 
theorists either accepted Rawls’s framework or criticized it; they 
could not ignore it.  For our purposes, though, the most important 
consequence is the prevalence of the concept of neutrality in 
liberal theory, most precisely articulated by Ronald Dworkin in 
1978 when he defined a liberal society as one in which 
“government must be neutral on what might be called the question 
of the good life.”117 
Dworkin used the term amidst a general defense of equality, 
arguing that liberalism seeks to rectify the fact that “natural talents 
are not distributed equally,”118 a notion he inherited from Rawls.  In 
other words, if one person is born smarter, stronger, or better 
looking than another, then he or she cannot be said to deserve the 
fruits of these talents.  Just as group identification is not an 
essential quality for Rawls, neither are talents.  This is a problematic 
 
 116. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, 
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND 
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).  See also CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILLIP PETTIT, 
RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS (1990) (containing a useful overview 
of Rawls’s theory and critiques of it). 
 117. Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 64 (Michael 
Sandel ed., 1984), originally published in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart 
Hampshire ed., 1978). 
 118. Id. at 68. 
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notion for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it 
makes one wonder what counts as personhood after someone is 
stripped of their most dominant characteristics.  Dworkin’s insight 
is Kantian in that it makes moral agents accountable for things that 
they can control rather than the consequences of any particular act 
or capacity.  It also makes individuals morally relevant as rational 
creatures alone. 
The virtue of Dworkin’s essay was not simply that it was an 
accurate portrayal of liberalism at the time, although it was.  The 
most important feature was his precise and clear execution of a 
core and intuitive political idea.  A good analytic, and a good 
philosopher of law, Dworkin articulated clear and bounded 
terminology upon which to center relevant discourse. His 
argument was made well, with strong justification, and he thereby 
provided an irresistible target for his critics.  The main issue, it 
turns out, is that his notion of neutrality is incoherent. 
Put simply, for a government to remain neutral on 
conceptions of the good life it must not take any position as to 
whether one end is more valuable than another.  Under liberalism, 
this is a private matter.  But the government must also protect its 
citizens from others.  Thus, the government must legislate against, 
for example, murder.  The prohibition of this act presumes, 
however, that the good life is a life not prematurely ended by 
another.  At its absolute minimum, a liberal government must be 
committed to protecting its citizens from unjustified violence, but if 
so, the liberal government cannot be neutral.119 
At issue are the nature of neutrality and the priority of the 
right and the good.120  The role of neutrality was never dominant 
until the late 1970s.  Since Rawls and Dworkin, liberalism is 
presumed to be neutral, and many liberals return to the priority of 
 
 119. It is worth adding, as William Galston does, that the commitment to 
neutrality is itself not neutral; it is a substantial moral position.  See WILLIAM A. 
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1991) (emphasizing this point particularly in part three of the book).  This is 
Kairys’ insight as well, although The Politics of Law goes further to suggest that 
neutrality might actually be harmful to the state and its people.  See KAIRYS, supra 
note 42, at 1–9. 
 120. These characteristics were originally used to describe certain aspects of 
liberalism, but have tended to serve as an essentialist definition instead.  Neutrality 
was anticipated by Locke in his remarks on toleration, and the term was used once 
by James Madison.  See Richard C. Sinopoli, Liberalism and Contested Conceptions of 
the Good: The Limits of Neutrality, 55 J. POL. 644, 646 (1993). 
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the right over the good in one form or another.121 
D. The Later Rawls’s Limitation of Bureaucracy 
Rawls’s response to this comes in his next book Political 
Liberalism, in which he calls the term neutrality “unfortunate.”122  
Although Rawls himself regards the two books as consistent, his 
assurances are unconvincing.  In the latter work, and in apparent 
response to claims that his conception of the political self was too 
“thin” to provide an adequate foundation for deliberation, Rawls 
removes the emphasis from the original position and rests his 
theory on an “overlapping consensus.”123  He claims instead that the 
original position was meant simply as a “device of representation,” 
but in doing so, he shakes the normative foundation presented in A 
Theory of Justice.124  The original position offered an objective ideal 
outside the political structure that provided guidance and direction 
for public policy, but without this objective standard there are no 
standards with which to judge the change. 
The necessity of a standard is a key issue in any discussion of 
progress, one that makes Sidney Fay suggest that the concept itself 
is “logically meaningless.”125  There is nothing inherent in progress 
itself that provides an end, Fay argues.  If all that makes an end is 
one person or group’s opinion, than one person’s progress may be 
another person’s arbitrariness.  This is why the enlightenment and 
nineteenth-century philosophers tended to see progress in terms of 
nature—a natural telos was normative, binding, and inherent in 
 
 121. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1980); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987) (both works 
defending forms of neutralist liberalism). 
 122. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 191. 
 123. Id. at 15, 39. 
 124. Id. at 24. 
 125. Fay writes: 
Ideas, no matter whether true or false, are often potent factors in social 
change.  Ideas are also apt to reflect the color and pattern of an era.  This 
is notably true of the idea of progress—that “civilization has moved, is 
moving, and will continue to move in a desirable direction.”  It depends 
on subjective value-judgments, which in turn often depend on the 
individual's emotional inclination toward optimism or pessimism.  No 
one can prove scientifically that birth control, the New Deal, or the 
atomic bomb denote progress in a desirable direction, because it is 
impossible to control and measure objectively all the facts involved.  
Judgments differ sharply.  There is hardly any social change that is not 
called progress by somebody.  The concept is logically meaningless.   
Fay, supra note 52, at 231. 
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progress itself. 
In the latter book, Rawls replaces the original position with an 
area of overlapping doctrinal commonality that all members of 
society share, although they may defend or justify it in different 
ways.126  He makes a distinction between a “comprehensive moral 
doctrine” and a “political conception of justice.”127  A 
comprehensive moral doctrine includes “conceptions of what is 
valuable in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and 
character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical 
conduct[.]”128  It is their comprehensive moral doctrine that people 
refer to when making substantive life decisions.  A political 
conception of justice is described by Rawls as a “module, an 
essential constituent part that in different ways fits into and can be 
supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
endure in the society regulated by it.”129  A political conception of 
justice is like a missing puzzle piece that can fit into and be the last 
piece needed for completion in a variety of jigsaw puzzles.  It is the 
political conception of justice that all members of society share and 
that serves as the overlapping consensus, the replacement for the 
original position. 
In short, Rawls’s argument is as follows: given the fact that 
modern society is pluralistic, one must organize it in such a way 
that difference and disagreement do not destabilize society itself.  
The pluralism of a well-ordered society lies in the diversity of its 
comprehensive moral doctrines.  Since the modern state is a 
representative democracy, various people, all of whom may hold 
different opinions on fundamental matters, must interact in order 
to make decisions.  Those engaged in deliberation must have some 
common ideas, otherwise interaction would be impossible, 
unproductive, and chaotic.  That which citizens share is the 
overlapping consensus and it defines the standards by which 
citizens qua citizens actually interact.  Citizens refer to and debate 
the details of the political conception of justice, but they believe in 
it because their comprehensive moral doctrine justifies them in 
 
 126. Rawls defines an overlapping consensus as follows: “Such a consensus 
consists of all of the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents 
in a more or less just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of 
justice is the political conception itself.”  RAWLS, supra note 101, at 15. 
 127. Id. at 145. 
 128. Id. at 175. 
 129. Id. at 145.  See also id. at 12 (using nearly the same language). 
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doing so.130 
There are two qualifications.  The first is that public discussion 
regarding the political conception of justice cannot be framed in 
terms of beliefs that the society does not have in common.  People 
can challenge American law in terms of legal precedent or central 
texts such as Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from a Birmingham 
Jail,131 for example, but they cannot do so by invoking 
denominational beliefs.132 
The second qualification is that the blueprint of the political 
conception of justice begins with a public political culture.133  
Individuals in a society share certain beliefs and develop political 
philosophies based upon what they already hold in common as a 
society.134  In other words, the device of representation that is the 
original position comes from an already existing picture of what is 
assumed to be just.  It does not stand on its own; it describes 
already existing social expectations. 
The consequences of these two qualifications are problematic.  
First, if the initial qualification is to be taken seriously, then only 
those who share the commonality of the political conception of 
justice are permitted to participate in society.  This prevents 
political change, since it limits social membership to those who 
already agree with one another.  I would argue that this really is not 
 
 130. For example, a Christian might believe that it is proper to pay taxes 
because Jesus remarked that one should give Caesar what he is due, while a 
capitalist might believe that it is proper to pay taxes because the money supplies 
the government the means to regulate contracts and the free market.  Both have 
radically different justifications for paying their taxes, but both share an authentic 
overlapping belief that one has a duty to do so. 
 131. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in LET FREEDOM 
RING: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Peter D. 
Levy ed., 1992).  Rawls references the shared content of the public political 
culture in Political Liberalism.  RAWLS, supra note 102, at 8, 14, 25, 43, 175. 
 132. Of course, King’s letter invokes very specific denominational beliefs, and 
one is forced to conclude, problematically, that for Rawls, it would be excluded in 
public debate.  One might argue that all King was doing was calling upon Aquinas’ 
theory of natural law, and therefore cites a text central to the democratic public 
political culture, but Aquinas’ work also cited denominational beliefs and as such 
would likely be excluded.  Or, to use my previous example, the Christian is 
prohibited from citing Jesus in a political context to persuade the capitalist. 
 133. RAWLS, supra note 102, 8–9. 
 134. For example, a case might be made that American citizens believe, almost 
uniformly, that a constitutional democracy is the proper and ideal basic structure 
for society.  Rawls would then argue that any development of any theory which 
came out of this public political culture would inevitably begin with the forming 
of, or the intent to form, a constitution.  Rawls's work appears to be no exception 
to this rule. 
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pluralism at all.  The consequence of the second qualification is 
that the device of representation known as the original position is 
reduced to a product of the dominant political culture.  It is 
neither necessary nor does it have a normative impact in anything 
other than a liberal democratic society.135 
Political Liberalism does contain a variety of progressive ideas 
just as A Theory of Justice does.  First, it regards contemporary liberal 
politics as a conflict of groups rather than of individuals.  Civil 
rights are awarded to the individual, but each person is understood 
as being a member of a tradition or belief system that provides 
rational justification for his or her beliefs.  Second, it sees day-to-
day political decision making as a product of public persuasion and 
constructed to ensure that all reasonable groups have the means 
and vocabulary for participation in governance.  Third, it 
recognizes that changes in society are matters of reform rather 
than revolution—this is an important and rarely discussed 
difference between the two books.  The public political culture 
changes over time, theoretically changing the comprehensive 
moral doctrines that share it.  Excluded groups may eventually 
enter the arena of reasonable discourse if they change their 
intolerant cores, but this involves stepping away from central beliefs 
and key texts that are incompatible with modern liberal 
democracies. 
Rawls has a point, of course.  Absolute tolerance of the 
intolerant is likely impossible; even though Political Liberalism is not 
as inclusive as A Theory of Justice, it still offers a significantly free 
society—one with more liberty than most.  Nevertheless, the 
relevant question is whether or not acknowledging a possibly 
unachievable ideal necessitates giving up all attempts at normative 
standards.  Kairys faces exactly this quandary regardless of which 
period of Rawls we attach him to. 
 
 135. I defend and provide much more detail regarding these in the first 
chapter of my dissertation.  Jack Russell Weinstein, Adam Smith and the Problem 
of Neutrality in Contemporary Liberal Theory (Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston University) (on file with author).  For our purposes, we 
should emphasize that Rawls has no claim to universality in his new argument.  
That which justifies the overlapping consensus is the tradition or comprehensive 
moral doctrine of the defender.  That which makes the overlapping consensus 
legitimate is simple commonality.  One can certainly imagine numerous political 
beliefs that may be held in common over a long period of time that are conducive 
to neither freedom nor equality. Part of what makes a liberal society normatively 
compelling is its ability to allow for new and radical ideas, like those put forth by 
the American progressives a century ago. 
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Suppose, for example, Kairys subscribes to the latter argument 
in Political Liberalism and argues that only by being aware of 
particular cultural and economic realities can the legal process be 
fair.  He then has to ask whether any individual circumstance or 
belief system is worthy of being excluded from the process and 
which circumstances have priority.  To make determinations, 
however, he has to appeal to some objective standard.  Otherwise, 
legal decision making becomes reduced to prejudice, tradition, or 
habit.  One would think that contemporary progressives would be 
opposed to this approach even if, in the end, it is their prejudices, 
traditions, or habits that set the standard. 
It is worth remarking that even though a constitutional system 
of law is built on precedent, it is rarely immediately clear whether 
legal decisions are based on prejudices, tradition, or habit.  Lack of 
precedent may make legal decisions arbitrary,136 but the 
establishment of precedent still needs objective grounding in order 
to have normative power.  The debate about the existence of 
natural law is essentially about providing this normative 
foundation; natural law plays the role in American 
constitutionalism that the original position plays in A Theory of 
Justice. 
Suppose, then, that Kairys sees his comments as consistent with 
Rawls’s earlier book.  In this case, he would likely argue that the 
interpretation of the principles of justice and the test of their efficacy 
are necessarily built on comparing their standards with the actual 
lifestyles of those who are governed by them.  Those who live in 
squalor, for example, are not being treated properly according to 
the principles of justice and are therefore subject to government 
assistance in reaching the minimal acceptable standard, whatever w 
turns out to be in that society. 
The late philosopher would have likely endorsed this approach 
without concern.  I suspect that this is what Kairys would have had 
in mind had he discussed progressivism from within a Rawlsian 
framework, although he clearly would have sympathies with the 
group dynamic of Political Liberalism as well.  Nevertheless, this 
approach presupposes that although the actual workings of the 
legal system consider context, the process that leads to the 
formation of the principles of justice cannot.  Context is only a 
 
 136. This is why then-U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Stone called 
the Nuremburg trials a “high-grade lynching party.”  ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, 
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 716 (Archon Books 1968). 
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temporary measure, as, for example, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Bakke.137  This approach negates any criticism that ignoring 
circumstance inherently invalidates the political system.  In short, for 
Kairys to be a progressive, he has to believe in progress.  To believe 
in progress, he has to have a compelling normative aim to progress 
towards, and as Rawls’s career shows, although context may provide 
a test for determining whether progress is being made, it only 
seems to impair the identification of what it is that progress hopes 
to achieve.138 
IV.  MORALITY AND THE MARKET 
Included in the concept of social progress is the idea of 
economic justice; many of the progressive reforms were about 
workplace issues and access to the material necessities of life.  As 
the history of progressive reform reminds us again and again, there 
is a significant tension between the individualism of the democratic 
process and the centralized nature of political philosophies and 
polices that rely upon the state for the maintenance of an equal 
playing field.  Add to this the suspicion progressives tend to have 
towards corporate interests, and one is forced to ask about the role 
of capitalism in the progressive agenda. 
Unger and West’s article—Progressive Politics and What Lies 
Ahead—offers us three elements of a progressive agenda for 
contemporary politics.  They argue that “society should be 
independently organized outside the government,” in order to 
strengthen, among other things, unions to better integrate 
corporate “insiders” and “outsiders.”139  This non-bureaucratic 
approach to change, as we have repeatedly seen, has a long history 
for progressives.  They also argue that “the law should develop 
 
 137. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291–97 (1978) (noting 
that, although civil rights legislation has often resulted from particular kinds of 
discrimination against as few as one minority group, the universal language of this 
legislation makes clear Congress’ intent to protect in equal measure the civil 
liberties of all persons). 
 138. An attentive reader might be tempted to suggest I am guilty of creating a 
false dichotomy, and argue that there are other forms of liberalism than just 
Rawls’s two attempts.  While I am sympathetic to this approach, I do not suggest in 
this article that these are the only two options for contemporary liberal theory.  
Instead, I am arguing that Rawls’s two positions are useful in articulating the 
specific issue of context and its relationship to bureaucracy in progressive thought.  
Insofar as this bifurcation stops being useful, I suggest a more nuanced discussion 
of liberalism is called for. 
 139. Unger & West, supra note 39, at 15. 
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standards to give a central push in schooling and employment . . . 
to those who suffer from an accumulation of forms of 
disadvantage,” once again relying on the state to mitigate those 
factors that popular political adjudication cannot.140  Third, they 
assert that “we should develop a broad based market-friendly effort 
to lift up the economic rearguard,” offering specific plans for 
independent management of diversified investments to “broaden[] 
. . . access to finance and technology.”141  They suggest that “[t]he 
outcome of such experiments is not the suppression of the market; 
it is the democratizing and diversification of the market.”142 
This last recommendation may seem out of place because of its 
“conservative” elements.  While we have already encountered 
Rawls’s attempt to raise the economic bottom rung, doing so by 
relying on the market, as Unger and West suggest, might seem 
counter-intuitive to many on the left.  Quite the contrary, though, 
this approach is representative of the progressive tendency towards 
reform rather than revolution.  Any political theory that wants to be 
taken seriously in today’s world must begin with capitalism, 
especially in the short run.  Completely rejecting free-market 
solutions is to reject virtually all modern political arrangements.  It 
may also—and this point is controversial—run counter to human 
nature.  As Adam Smith wrote in 1776, whether we consider 
advanced institutions of finance or the earliest forms of trade, it 
may be that there is a “necessary, though very slow and gradual 
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature . . . to truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another.”143  Exchange is a 
progressive practice that may be the “necessary consequence of the 
faculties of reason and speech,” unique to humans alone.144 
At the core of much skepticism about market solutions is the 
modern view that the free market is somehow separate from moral 
considerations.  While there are many theorists working to develop 
theories of a more moral marketplace, few, if any, on the left, 
regard the market as itself inherently moral.  At most, they may 
regard it as a neutral tool reflecting the individual moralities of 
economic agents.  This section will focus specifically on the case of 
 
 140. Id. at 13. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, I.ii.1–2, 25 (R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS]. 
 144. Id. 
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Adam Smith.  What I hope to show, first, is that for Smith, relying 
on the free market was, by design, a moral solution: what would 
later be called capitalism was for him a system of morality.  Second, 
Smith argued that a well-structured free market can, by design, 
raise the bottom rung of society.145  While I will not go so far as to 
suggest that Smith himself was a progressive, I will argue that 
Smith’s theories share many elements with progressive political 
approaches and that the identification of Smith as a conservative 
icon is the result of a separation of morality and market that runs 
counter to his own vision. 
A. Adam Smith on Universal Opulence 
For Smith, the free market is itself the consequence of 
progress.  Building on Turgot and heavily influencing Marx, Smith 
sees political organization as dependent on economic 
arrangements.  Human history has witnessed the unfolding of four 
economic stages beginning with the age of hunters, and moving 
through pastoral, agricultural, and finally commercial societies.146  
There is no doubt that Smith sees this as progress.147 
Like many before him, Smith saw his epoch as the highest 
stage, but unlike earlier notions of progress, he recognized that his 
period was not the end goal.  Instead, he was very much concerned 
with the progress of “opulence,” as he called it, and argued that the 
division of labor was the cause of “that universal opulence which 
extends itself to the lowest ranks of people,” the result being that, 
“a general plenty diffuses itself through the different ranks of the 
society.”148 
His major concern is the refutation of mercantilism, an 
economic theory that argued that the wealth of a nation was to be 
measured by the amount of money in its borders at any given 
moment.149  Smith argued instead that it is the amount of labor in 
any given society that adequately measures its wealth.150  Wealth as 
 
 145. See generally id. at 1–60. 
 146. See id. at V.i.a.1–8, 689–94; ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 
(A)I.27 1, 14 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1766) [hereinafter LECTURES]. 
 147. His description begins with the classification of hunter-gatherers as “the 
lowest and rudest state of society,” and refers to the middle stages as “more 
advanced.”  SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at V.i.a.1–8, 689–94. 
 148. Id. at I.i.10, 22. 
 149. See generally id. at Book IV, 428 passim. 
 150. The very first sentence of the book argues that labor supplies a nation 
with “all the necessaries and conveniences of life,” both through the product of 
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seen from a mercantilist perspective is concentrated in the wealthy, 
but when seen via Smith’s approach, all workers benefit from 
economic advancement.  Smith shared the progressive concern 
(and Marx’s concern) for the laborer’s well being. 
For Smith, economic growth was a matter of justice, not simply 
the profit motive: “Servants, labourers and workmen of different 
kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society.  
But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never 
be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole.”151  He adds that 
exceptionally low wages must be supplemented by other means of 
sustenance in order to be “consistent with common humanity.”152  
He explains: 
A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at 
least be sufficient to maintain him.  They must even upon 
most occasions be somewhat more; otherwise it would be 
impossible for him to bring up a family, and the race of 
such workmen could not last beyond the first 
generation.153 
Here, Smith is offering a precursor to Rawls’s maximin 
principle—the assertion that agents in the original position will 
seek the maximum minimum standard of living.  The justification 
for an economic system is whether it betters the living standard for 
all its members, not just the wealthy.  Comparing societies in 
different economic stages, Smith insists that the difference in 
economic circumstance between a European prince and the 
“industrious and frugal peasant” is much less than that between an 
African king and those tribal members over which he is, “absolute 
master.”154 
In amplifying his critique of mercantilism, and against the 
 
the labor and the goods exchanged with other countries, an exchange that could 
not take place without labor.  Id. at Intro.i.1, 10. 
 151. Id. at I.viii.36, 96.  Smith adds, 
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable.  It is but equity, besides, 
that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, 
should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be 
themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.   
Id. 
 152. Id. at I.viii.16, 86. 
 153. Id. at I.viii.15, 85.  Smith adds, “Thus far at least seems certain, that, in 
order to bring up a family, the labour of the husband and wife together must, even 
in the lowest species of common labour, be able to earn something more than 
what is precisely necessary for their own maintenance.”  Id. at I.viii.15, 85–86. 
 154. Id. at I.i.10–11, 22–24. 
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physiocrats—those who believed that economic growth was the 
result of agricultural development155—Smith argued that economic 
development was to a large extent the result of the interaction 
between “the inhabitants of the town and those of the country.”156  
Despite the obvious competition, Smith is explicit that the town 
and country share in a reciprocal relationship.157  Nevertheless, 
Smith argues, because “subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior 
to conveniency and luxury,” when necessary, the country must take 
precedence over the town when there is conflict: food comes 
first.158 
We see that like Kant, Smith sees progress as the result of 
interaction and tension.159  In short, Smith sees economic 
advancement as the aggregate of individual activities, and he 
famously argues for a limited government to protect this sphere of 
autonomy.160  Nevertheless, Smith’s government is not as limited as 
is generally assumed.  There are only three duties of the sovereign: 
to protect the society from “violence and invasion” by other 
societies; to protect “every member of the society from the injustice 
or oppression of every other member”; and to erect and maintain 
public works and institutions the cost of which are too great with 
too few consequent benefits or profits for an individual or small 
group to finance.161  These public goods include armies, police, 
public works, public schools, and general and religious 
education.162 
 
 155. Turgot was a physiocrat. 
 156. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at III.i.1, 376.  He 
explains: “The country supplies the town with the means of subsistence and the 
materials of manufacture.  The town repays this supply by sending back a part of 
the manufactured produce to the inhabitants of the country.”  Id. 
 157. Id.  “[T]he division of labour,” he explains, “is in this, as in all other cases, 
advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into 
which it is subdivided.”  Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  Smith, along with Turgot and the other physiocrats, thought that all 
else being equal, individuals would prefer the tranquility and beauty of the 
country and would always prefer to use their capital for agricultural purposes.  But, 
he adds “[i]f human institutions had never thwarted those natural inclinations, the 
towns could nowhere have increased beyond what the improvement and 
cultivation of the territory in which they were situated could support.”  Id. at III.i.3, 
377.  Cultivation of the ground is, according to Smith, “the original destination of 
man.”  Id.  As a result, “in every stage of his existence he seems to retain a 
predilection for this primitive employment.”  Id. at III.i.3, 378. 
 160. Id. at IV.ix.51, 687–88. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Of course, the term “public goods” is itself a matter of great controversy, 
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Smith sees the state as contributing to the overall betterment 
of society: it plays an important role in childhood and adult 
education, it promotes literacy and attention to the arts, and it 
cultivates social interaction to minimize loneliness and alienation, 
to name just a few of its roles.163  How deep the state’s 
responsibilities towards these ends are for Smith is a matter of 
controversy, but most contemporary Smith scholars ought to agree 
that the discussion is infinitely more controversial than it should be 
as a result of a major misstep in nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century commentary on Smith.  What I argue here is that the 
inaccurate view of Smith as a strict laissez faire conservative can be 
remedied by taking a progressive point of view and by recognizing 
that the architect of modern free-market theory recognized, as 
Unger and West did two centuries later, that morality and the 
marketplace are significantly intertwined and interdependent. 
B. The Market as a Moral Influence 
Famously, economist Joseph Schumpeter argued that The 
Wealth of Nations did not contain one original idea.164  It is certainly 
the case that Smith was well-versed in the literature of his time and 
built heavily on the research of those who came before him; this is 
of course what scholars do.  But Schumpeter misses the point: 
Smith’s great achievement was not his individual conclusions, but 
his elegant and compelling system.165  It is therefore not surprising 
that the most enduring impediment to understanding Smith’s work 
is the stubborn attempt to push aside those elements of his system 
that are incompatible with the laissez faire caricature of Smith.  This 
 
but Smith has no particular attachment to a minimalist conception of it.  Smith’s 
theories are perfectly compatible with a more inclusive notion of public good.  As 
Jeremy Z. Muller explains, Smith, “argued against government involvement less as 
a matter of principle than as a matter of strategy, and he was willing to depart from 
that strategy when there were compelling reasons.”  JERRY Z. MULLER, ADAM SMITH 
IN HIS TIME AND OURS 140 (1993) (emphasis in original). 
 163. I have argued elsewhere, in great detail, about the role of the state in 
providing non-economic support for individuals in society.  See, e.g., JACK RUSSELL 
WEINSTEIN, ON ADAM SMITH (2001); Jack Russell Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and 
Education: Social Unity on the Work of Adam Smith, 22 ECON. & PHIL. 79 (2006) 
[hereinafter Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and Education]; Jack Russell Weinstein, 
Adam Smith’s Philosophy of Education, 3 ADAM SMITH REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
 164. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 184–85 (Elizabeth 
Boody Schumpeter ed., Oxford University Press 1954). 
 165. Schumpeter does recognize the value of Smith’s system, but he 
underestimates, in my view, its overall impact.  See generally id. 
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includes Book Five of The Wealth of Nations, which continues the 
important discussion of the role of the state in a market economy; 
but even more so, fidelity to the caricature necessitates the 
complete rejection of Smith’s first and highly successful book The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
First published in 1759 while Smith was Chair of Moral 
Philosophy at Glasgow college, the stated purpose of The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments is to investigate the nature of virtue and how it is to 
be acquired.166  Unlike Kant, who is ultimately a rationalist, Smith 
sees virtue as acquired through our senses.  By observing others, 
entering into their very specific perspectives, and developing an 
impartial conscience to be the final judge of our own action, moral 
actors discover general rules of morality that then guide their 
actions.167 Essential to this experience what Smith calls sympathy—
the process of fellow feeling with another person.168  A spectator 
observes a person’s act, endeavors to understand the context that 
 
 166. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS VII.i.2, 265 (D.D. 
Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Liberty  Classics, 1992) (1759) [hereinafter SMITH, 
MORAL SENTIMENTS]. 
 167. Id. at III.4.8, 159–60. 
 168. Social and moral unity is also enabled through sympathy, which Smith 
distinguishes quite explicitly from its standard usage denoting sharing only “the 
sorrow of others.”  Id. at I.i.1.5, 10.  Sympathy allows for the “original passions” 
that makes one person’s happiness “necessary” to another, and makes people 
“naturally” interested “in the fortune of others,” even though a person “derives 
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”  Id. at I.i.1.1, 9.  It is the natural 
capacity that allows for moral judgment, although Smith is less than precise in his 
definition of this central concept.  He defines sympathy as a “fellow-feeling with 
any passion whatever” aroused in a spectator, but then spends much of the rest of 
the text qualifying and investigating its limits.  Id. at I.i.1.5, 10.  Smith is an 
empiricist, coping with the fundamentally separate nature of human beings.  Our 
physical separation therefore requires a moral theory derived from sensations and 
events occurring to others.  See Henry J. Bittermann, Adam Smith’s Empiricism and 
the Law of Nature I, 48 J. POL. & ECON. 510 (1940).  Sympathy is a “cognitive 
process,” inspiring both change of “circumstances” and “personhood” with others.  
Philippe Fontaine, Identification and Economic Behavior: Sympathy and Empathy in 
Historic Perspective, 13 ECON. & PHIL. 261, 264 (1997).  According to Smith, 
sympathy, through observation of a moral actor, causes “an analogous emotion” to 
“spring up” in the “breast” of an “attentive spectator.” SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, 
supra note 166, at I.i.1.5, 10.  It is, by “changing places in fancy with the sufferer, 
that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels.”  Id. at I.i.1.3, 
10.  This adoption of the perspective of another is, according to many 
commentators, an attempt to, “temper the self-centerdness of our perspective.”  
Russell Nieli, Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith Problem, 48 J. HIST. IDEAS 611, 
617 (1986).  It is also an effort to “deflect the criticism that sympathy is founded 
on self-love.”  Robert Sugden, Beyond Sympathy and Empathy: Adam Smith’s Concept of 
Fellow-Feeling, 18 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 75 (2002). 
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gave rise to the act, and then makes a moral judgment as to 
whether the person was acting appropriately to the cause.  If the 
spectator judges that a particular act was appropriate—if the 
spectator is able to determine, while taking the specific and unique 
perspective of the actor, that he or she would act in the identical 
manner—then the spectator is said to sympathize with the person.  
This harmonization of sentiments is the arbiter of that which is 
ethical. 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments begins with the assertion that 
although it is often assumed that human beings are purely selfish, 
there are natural inclinations within each person to care about 
others.169  Smith is explicit that human beings are not egoistic, they 
are not only concerned about others, and that their identities are 
largely constructed by the society that raises them.170  Moral 
judgments, like judgments of beauty, are impossible outside of 
society.171  He writes: 
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we 
can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we 
remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, 
and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from 
us.  But we can do this in no other way than by 
endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, 
or as other people are likely to view them.  Whatever 
judgment we can form concerning them, accordingly, 
must always bear some secret reference, either to what 
are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to 
what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others.  
We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine 
any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.  
If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly 
enter into all the passions and motives which influenced 
it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of 
this supposed equitable judge.  If otherwise, we enter into 
his disapprobation, and condemn it.172 
Here Smith prefigures Rawls’s critics.  Substantive judgments 
must be contextual. To know yourself is to know how others see 
 
 169. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at I.i.1.1, 9. 
 170. See generally Jack Russell Weinstein, ON ADAM SMITH (2001) (chapter three 
is particularly relevant to his point); Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and Education, 
supra note 163. 
 171. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at III.i.2, 109–10. 
 172. Id. at III.i.2, 110. 
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you.  A word of caution is necessary, however.  Even though Smith 
is striving for some form of impartiality, it is not an Archimedean 
perspective.  There is no God’s-eye view and there can be no 
original position.  Individuals need self and social knowledge to 
morally adjudicate matters. 
Foreshadowing twentieth-century identity politics, Smith 
spends a great deal of time discussing how group identity such as 
gender, class, and race (as represented by a discussion of slavery) 
inhibit understanding amongst people.173  He also offers an 
extended discussion of how the desire to be rich and the 
community’s celebration of those who are rich, distort moral 
judgment.174 
The sympathetic core of this first book, combined with Smith’s 
critical attitude towards the wealthy, makes for an uneasy 
partnership between The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of 
Nations, according to some.  Citing the so-called “Adam Smith 
Problem,” scholars have repeatedly argued that the two books are, 
simply put, inconsistent.175  The first is based on altruism, they 
argue, and the second is based on egoism. 
This view, in its contemporary manifestation, is one of the 
great barriers to progressive thought.  Since morality and the 
market are assumed to be incompatible, it is argued, the 
progressive philosophy that relies on both must be self-
contradictory.  Altruistic morality cannot, the argument continues, 
be compatible with selfish economic motive, by definition.  
However, as is the case for those who make this argument against 
progressives, those who argued against Smith in this manner were 
deeply mistaken. 
 
 173. See generally Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and Education, supra note 163. 
 174. Smith explains: 
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the 
powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and 
mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the 
distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the 
great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral 
sentiments. 
SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at I.iii.3.1, 61. 
 175. See, e.g., JAMES R. OTTESON, ADAM SMITH’S MARKETPLACE OF LIFE (2002); 
VIVIENNE BROWN, ADAM SMITH’S DISCOURSE: CANONICITY, COMMERCE AND 
CONSCIENCE (1994); PETER MINOWITZ, PROFITS, PRIESTS, AND PRINCES: ADAM SMITH'S 
EMANCIPATION FROM POLITICS AND RELIGION (1993); KENNETH LUX, ADAM SMITH'S 
MISTAKE: HOW A MORAL PHILOSOPHER INVENTED ECONOMICS AND ENDED MORALITY 
(1990). 
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Sometimes described as a translation mistake, the motivation 
of the Adam Smith Problem was as political as it was 
philosophical.176  The German thinkers saw Smith’s philosophy as a 
threat in two ways.  First they feared that the “Adam Smith School” 
sought to “monopolize manufacturing in England” and were 
threatened by the individualistic emphasis they viewed as 
“opposition to the older cameralistic tradition that assumed that 
society and its members needed guidance.”177  Second, they 
“conflated the ideals of the French revolution with Smith’s legacy” 
and hoped to “‘overcome” Smith and Rousseau’s “rationalistic 
Enlightenment.”178  Only in the past thirty years have scholars 
collectively challenged its legitimacy, reasserting that sympathy is 
not altruism and that self-interest is neither the single motive for 
economic activity nor purely egoistic. 
The short solution179 to the Adam Smith Problem is as follows: 
first, making oneself more moral and living in a more just and 
more ethical community is a form of bettering oneself, and Smith 
never suggests that betterment is entirely economic.  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, sympathy is not a form of altruism at all 
and The Wealth of Nations is not built entirely on selfish behavior.  As 
we have already seen, Smith’s treatise on political economy is rife 
with ethical considerations. 
C. The Butcher, the Brewer, the Baker, and the Invisible Hand 
Smith’s two most famous assertions are often cited as the basis 
for the incompatibility.  First: “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, not 
to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities but of their advantages.”180  Smith’s argument 
here is that economic activity is governed by self-interest, an 
assertion that has developed into a modern unquestionable truth.  
Commercial activity advances as individuals pursue their own 
 
 176. See BRUNO HILDEBRAND, DIE NATIONALÖKOMMIE DER GEGENWART UND 
ZUKUNFT (1848); CARL G. KNIES, DIE POLITISCHE OEKONOMIE VOM STANDPUNKTE DER 
GESCHICHTLICHEN METHODE (1883); WITOLD VON SKARZYNSKI, MORALPHILOSOPH 
UND SCHOEPFER DER NATIONALOEKONOMIE (1878). 
 177. LEONIDAS MONTES, ADAM SMITH IN CONTEXT 20–24 (2004). 
 178. Id. at 24–28. 
 179. See Jack Russell Weinstein, Review: James W. Otteson’s “Adam Smith’s 
Marketplace of Life”, 113 MIND 202 (2004) (discussing this point in more depth). 
 180. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.ii.2, 27. 
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needs, this approach assumes. 
This was a revolutionary assertion.  Theorists who argued 
versions of it before Smith were often condemned, largely because 
of Christian attitudes towards selfishness.181  While there is no 
doubt that Smith’s intent was to tout the economic benefits of self-
interest, these were not his only intentions.  The second assertion is 
that “[n]obody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the 
benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”182  The beggar relies on 
benevolence sometimes but on barter at other times.  People’s 
motivations change.  Sometimes they are altruistic, sometimes they 
are not.  According to Smith “[w]e address ourselves, not to [the 
Butcher’s, Brewer’s, and Baker’s] humanity but to their self-love.”183  
However, we could choose to do otherwise, because in each of these 
agents, Smith is clear, “their humanity” is present.184  For Smith, 
“man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, 
and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.  
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his 
favour.”185 
Smith comes to a pragmatic and not a philosophical 
conclusion here.  We can appeal to people’s benevolence, and 
sometimes it will result in our assistance, but we will be more likely to 
succeed if we appeal to their commercial instincts.  The comment 
about the self interest of the butcher and the baker is ultimately a 
comment about persuasion.186 
Smith is also famous for referencing the invisible hand: the 
metaphor he uses to describe the economic progress of a market 
economy.187  In both of his books, the phrase is meant to indicate 
 
 181. See BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK 
BENEFITS (F.B. Kaye ed., Liberty Classics 1988) (1705).  This is the most significant 
work arguing this point before Smith.  It was first published as one volume in 
1732, but published separately in pieces starting with The Grumbling Hive in 1705. 
 182. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.ii.2, 27 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at I.ii.2, 26 (emphasis added). 
 186. STEVEN J. MCKENNA, ADAM SMITH: THE RHETORIC OF PROPRIETY 134 (2006). 
In fact, as we have already noted, commercial activity is itself, for Smith, “the 
necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech.”  SMITH, WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.ii.2, 25.  It is built on “the natural inclination 
everyone has to persuade.” SMITH, LECTURES, supra note 146, (A) vi.57, 352.  As a 
result, according to Smith, “everyone is practicing oratory on others thro the 
whole of his life.”  Id. 
 187. Smith uses the phrase three times: The two times mentioned below, and a 
third time as a reference to primitive religions.  ADAM SMITH, ESSAYS ON 
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that individuals’ economic self-interest results in adequate 
distribution of goods for most members of the society.  The 
metaphor serves two purposes.  First, it highlights the role of 
unintended consequences, as in The Wealth of Nations: 
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign 
industry, he intends only his own security; and by 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention.188 
In contrast, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
complements his comment about the economic differential 
between European princes and their serfs.  He writes: 
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious 
and agreeable.  They consume little more than the poor, 
and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, 
though they mean only their own conveniency, though 
the sole end which they propose from the labours of all 
the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of 
their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the 
poor the produce of all their improvements.  They are led 
by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution 
of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, 
had the earth been divided into equal portions among all 
its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford 
means to the multiplication of the species.189 
It is noteworthy that Smith’s use of the invisible hand in his 
economic treatise is really about politics and social engineering, 
and its use in his treatise on morality is largely about economics.190  
This latter claim, that because of the rapacity of the rich, the poor 
have what they require, seems prima facie false.191  However, two 
things might be said in his defense.  The first is that Smith did not 
anticipate modern shifts in the accumulation of capital or 
revolutionary technologies like refrigeration that enable the 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 29 (W.P.D. Wightman & J.C. Bryce eds., Liberty Classics 
1982) (1795). 
 188. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at IV.ii.9, 456. 
 189. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at IV.1.10, 184–85. 
 190. This comes with one qualifier, as I shall indicate later. 
 191. Weinstein, On Adam Smith, supra note 163, at 65–66. 
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consolidation of wealth and goods in extreme quantities.  The 
second is that Smith is claiming that “necessaries” are distributed 
fairly, but not luxuries.  Smith is little concerned with the latter.192 
On the other hand, there is a strong element of truth in his 
approach.  The “rapacious” desires of modern day celebrities 
employ huge numbers of workers and the American and Western 
European way of life is responsible for vast economic activity 
around the globe.  Smith himself, in an overwhelming and quite 
beautiful passage, enumerates the thousands of people involved in 
the manufacture of a simple woolen coat.193  From Smith’s point of 
view, free trade increases labor which increases wealth in all trading 
nations.  Protectionism is simply a modern form of mercantilism. 
More important, it is worth noticing that in the midst of his 
economic discussion is an ethical observation.  Smith’s ultimate 
point in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that material wealth is not 
the final arbiter of happiness, and that, “in ease of body and peace 
of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and 
the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses 
that security which kings are fighting for.”194  The invisible hand 
supplies material goods but the capacity for morality and happiness 
comes from elsewhere. 
There is a romanticism here that must be condemned, of 
course.  Being forced to beg is not pleasurable, and no matter how 
we read Smith, all of his writing will never be suited to the 
contemporary sensibilities.  Modern notions of justice have 
progressed, if I may use the word, and our understandings of 
oppression and inequality have grown significantly more 
sophisticated.  Nevertheless, what is important for our purposes is 
not whether all of Smith’s claims are empirically correct, but 
whether his theoretical filter can be of use to us, as I argue that it 
can.  What is most useful about Smith’s work for the modern 
progressive is his deep understanding of the intimate relationship 
 
 192. As we have already touched upon, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
argues that the rich are ridiculously overattentive to luxury and that it is a sign of 
bad character to be so.  SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at I.iii.3.1, 61–
62.  In The Wealth of Nations, he critically claims that, “with the greater part of rich 
people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in 
their eyes is never so compleat as when they appear to posses those decisive marks 
of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves.”  SMITH, WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, supra note 143, at I..xi.c.31, 190. 
 193. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.i.11, 22–24. 
 194. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at IV.i.10, 185. 
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between economic and moral life.  Sympathy regulates behavior 
between known parties: family members, friends, neighbors, and 
colleagues.  As Smith argues in graphic detail, duty governs 
behavior between those who have no contact and little sense of a 
shared world.195  The market, however, governs the behavior that 
falls through the cracks between sympathy and duty, and, at least 
Smith argues, if those who are in need can harness the self-interest 
of others, each person will have an easier time finding his or her 
means of survival, as the beggar ultimately received from the 
butcher, brewer and baker, all of whom, in return, received from 
the beggar their own lunch. 
Ultimately, then, the resolution to “The Adam Smith Problem” 
necessitates thinking like a progressive.  Readers ought to be willing 
to start from the assumption that morality and the market are not 
only compatible but complementary.  They will understand Smith 
better if they reject the notion that the market is either neutral or 
inherently unjust, and progressive points of view will regain a 
powerful ally in their fight for a more just economic system.  Unger 
and West were not at all inconsistent in looking towards the market 
to achieve progressive aims.  The market, when maintained by the 
state, when governed under the right conditions, when 
complemented by education, arts, and a supportive community, 
can be a useful and moral force for social and economic progress. 
V. CONCLUSION: A TENTATIVE DEFINITION OF THE TERM 
PROGRESSIVE 
Reform comes from a myriad of sources.196  Yet, progressive 
reforms are of a particular type.  They seek fundamental change 
but hope to maintain the society they critique; they assume a 
particular end but recognize that their goals may be a long time 
coming; they demand democratic participation but recognize the 
centralization and collective nature necessary to support 
individuals; they idealize the goal of impartiality but understand 
the necessity of context; and they bridge a spectrum of issues that 
 
 195. Id. at III.3.4–7, 136–39.  To make this point in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he uses the example of the duty a European would have to people in 
China who are the victim of a terrible earthquake.  Id. 
 196. Adam Smith himself referred to The Wealth of Nations as a “very violent 
attack . . . upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain.”  ADAM SMITH, 
CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH 251 (E.C. Mossner & I.S. Ross eds., Liberty 
Classics 1987) (1776). 
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range over all areas in society.  While the American progressive 
movement has only been identified as such for slightly longer than 
a century, its philosophical foundation has been evolving slowly for 
hundreds of years longer. 
I began this discussion by lamenting the lack of a 
straightforward definition for the term progressive.  Especially in 
the American context, the label is complex and nuanced.197  I am 
reluctant to offer a definition of the term, despite this lengthy 
philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, the nature of this essay 
demands an attempt on my part to do so, and I therefore offer the 
following tentative definition: a progressive is a person who believes 
that social reform is achievable over time with the proper mixture 
of individual participation and government support.  He or she 
looks to the future not the past for a better time, and recognizes 
that there is a universal standard for justice while acknowledging 
that only by understanding particular contexts and circumstances 
can the adequacy of the progress be measured.  All people are 
equally entitled to the fruits of progress, the progressive believes, 
but how these fruits are distributed may depend on the nature of 
circumstance.  Group identification is therefore essential to 
understanding any individual’s situation but it should not eclipse 
an individual’s unique situation or perspective.  In short, the 
progressive seeks moderation: moderation in change, moderation 
in assistance, and moderation in autonomy.  Perhaps then, the 
democratic activist mentioned at the outset of this article was 
correct after all. 
 
 
 197. For example, even though neither Rawls nor Smith are, strictly speaking, 
progressives, their insights into social justice and economic life help articulate the 
philosophical assumptions that provide progressivism its depth and sophistication. 
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